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COMMENT
North Carolina's Domestic Violence Act: Preventing Spouse Abuse?
A young woman,* beaten again by her husband, fears for her life and
the lives of her children. Heavy drinking, unemployment and financial
trouble fuel his rage. Embarrassment and financial dependence keep her
from turning to family or friends. Not wanting to hurt the children
keeps her locked into the bad relationship. The children will be hurt,
however, whether she leaves or not.
This scene typifies the violent domestic arena. The spouse abuse' it
engenders is widespread.2 Women are overwhelmingly more likely to be
victims than are men.3 Wife beating is perpetuated from generation to
generation,4 and is common in different socioeconomic groups.5
Until recently abused women seeking protection had few legal op-
tions.6 At most, a woman could get an injunction ordering her spouse not
* Although men are also victims of domestic violence, this comment recognizes the much
greater frequency with which women are victimized. Accordingly, where reference is made to peti-
tioners complaining of domestic violence, female gender is generally used.
1. Spouse abuse can involve physical and emotional domestic violence between spouses.
North Carolina defines domestic violence quite broadly:
Domestic violence means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between past or
present spouses or between persons of the opposite sex who are living together or have lived
together as if married, or between one of such persons and a minor child who is in the custody
of or residing with the other person.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B (Supp. 1985) (the Act was only recently amended in 1985 to protect
children).
2. In 1978 murder between spouses and unmarried couples accounted for approximately 13%
of all murders in the U.S. F.B.I., CRIME IN THE U.S. 9 (1978); CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM'N
ON FAMILY LAW, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE app. F at 119 (Ist report 1978) (sets nationwide figures of
abused wives at one million annually).
3. Between married persons as opposed to unmarried, wives are the victims of more frequent
and severe physical abuse. Each year from 1.8 to 3.3 million wives are beaten by their husbands to
280,000 husbands beaten by their wives. Domestic Violence and Legislation With Respect to Domes-
tic Violence: Hearings on S. 1728 Before the Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Note, The Case for the Legal Remedies for
Abused Woman, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 136-37 (1977) (cites figures ranging from
one to twenty-eight million women beaten annually nationwide).
4. Boys who watch their fathers beat their mothers are likely to beat their spouses when
adults. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (3d ed. 1979).
5. A study in predominantly middle class Norwalk, Connecticut, showed police receive ap-
proximately the same number of domestic abuse complaints as do police in a lower socioeconomic-
classed Harlem neighborhood. Barden, Wife Beating: Few of Them Ever Appear Before a Court of
Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1974, at A38, col. 1.
6. Lerman, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, Response to Violence in the Family, Sept.-
Oct. 1981, at 1.
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to abuse her while divorce, separation, or custody proceedings were
pending.7 Criminal sanctions for assault against an abusive spouse have
not been traditionally pursued because of a reluctance by law enforce-
ment officials to enter the domestic domain.' North Carolina responded
to this problem in 1979 by enacting the Domestic Violence Act.9 Under
the Act, a woman may motion the district court for emergency relief if
she believes there is an imminent danger of serious bodily injury by the
threat of force to herself or her minor children."° Emergency relief in-
cludes temporary protective orders prohibiting alleged abusers from en-
tering the parties' home, and awarding child custody to allegedly abused
women for up to ten days before a hearing on the complaint."
In Smart v. Smart the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
standard for showing good cause under the Act sufficient to grant emer-
gency protective orders is an "[i]mmediate and present danger of such
act of violence or attempted violence against the victim or minor children
.... ,12 Such ex parte orders temporarily deprive alleged spouse abusers
of significant liberty and property interests in the custody of their chil-
dren and access to their homes. 3 North Carolina has not yet addressed
deprivation of respondents' due process rights in depth. Part I of this
comment explores the nature and constitutionality of ex parte orders for
emergency relief under the Act. Part II analyzes respondents' due pro-
cess rights in light of decisions from other jurisdictions. Part III exam-
ines the practical application of North Carolina's Domestic Violence Act
and compares it with legislation from other states. Finally, Part IV dis-
cusses the implementation of the Act in North Carolina since 1979, and
suggests alternative procedures that may better aid the prevention of do-
mestic abuse while not unduly burdening the due process rights of al-
leged abusers.
I. Ex PARTE ORDERS FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF
Ex parte orders, also known as temporary restraining orders, are in-
junctions granted without notice to the defendant.14 The trial judge
hears only the plaintiff's side of the story. The defendant does not have
the chance to attack plaintiff's claim or present his own at this time."5
7. Id.
8. In California, police departments usually do not keep separate statistics on wife abuse,
showing perhaps a low priority. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 122.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (1981).
10. Id. § 50B-2(b) (1981). Although Chapter 50B recognizes the threat domestic violence poses
to children, the vast problem of child abuse is beyond the scope of this comment.
11. Id. § 50B-2 (1981).
12. 59 N.C. App. 533, 535 n.l, 297 S.E.2d 135, 137 n.1 (1982).
13. "Ex parte" means "by or for one party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979).
14. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.10, at 107 (1973).
15. Id.
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Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the
applicant for a temporary restraining order (TRO) show (1) immediate
and irreparable harm or damage will result to the applicant before the
respondent can be heard in opposition, and (2) what effort, if any, has
been made to give notice and why notice should not be required.16 Rule
65(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires essentially
the same showing.17
The temporary ex parte order granted by the Act requires a showing
by petitioner that she believes respondent is threatening her with serious
and immediate injury."i This is similar to the "irreparable injury" re-
quired by Rule 65(b) of both the Federal and North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, express reasons why notice should not be
given before the court grants a protective order are not required. Only a
finding of "good cause" is required under the Act, and is defined in
Smart as an "immediate and present danger of such act of violence or
attempted violence against the victim or minor children."' 9 This merely
reiterates the irreparable injury standard. The North Carolina Legisla-
ture has chosen to lessen the burden on threatened women by dropping
the usual TRO requirement of showing why notice is not needed. This
significantly affects the due process rights of men accused of beating their
wives and lovers, and has made some judges reluctant to grant ex parte
relief.
Ex parte orders were traditionally used by creditors to garnish a
debtor's wages or to repossess financed property in arrears. 20 Garnished
property was seized at the beginning of the suit before a hearing on the
merits of plaintiff's claim. Courts viewed this as an in rem action against
the property and therefore, personal jurisdiction over the owner/defend-
ant was unnecessary.21
The Supreme Court in 1969 halted garnishment without a prior hear-
ing in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., holding that prejudgment gar-
nishment of wages by creditors without prior notice or a hearing violates
procedural due process. 22 Two years later the Court struck two replevin
statutes in Fuentes v. Shevin, holding that prejudgment repossession of
financed goods on petition by a creditor without prior hearing violates
procedural due process. 23 In North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, the
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
17. "A T.R.O. may be granted without notice.., if it clearly appears... that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage will result before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon,"
and shall define "why the order was granted without notice." N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(b).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2(b) (1984).
19. 59 N.C. App. at 535 n.1, 297 S.E.2d at 137 n.1.
20. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 48 (2d ed. 1979).
21. Id.
22. 395 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1969).
23. 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
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Court struck a state procedure which permitted any clerk of court to
issue prejudgment orders garnishing the debtor's bank account on peti-
tion by the creditor without an early hearing.2 4 Inadequate judicial re-
view of the debtor's interest in his property led the Court to hold that
procedural due process was violated in the three previous cases. The
Court found adequate procedural protection under Louisiana's prejudg-
ment sequestration system in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co." Louisiana
required a creditor to post a bond for the debtor's protection, file affida-
vits swearing to the truth of his claim, and allege that he had reason to
believe the debtor would encumber or dispose of the property during the
proceedings. This protection of the debtor's interest and minimization of
the risk of the creditor's wrongful temporary possession led the Court to
distinguish Mitchell from the above cases.
Depriving fundamental interests with ex parte orders is not without
strong criticism. Note Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach: "Since
this deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis, [respondent]
must be assured the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice
and a hearing." 6 Although procedural due process analysis has been
extended since Sniadach to include balancing several competing fac-
tors,27 the strong language repeated throughout the Sniadach-Fuentes
line of cases requiring notice and a hearing before depriving due process
interests is particularly applicable to pre-hearing deprivations of access to
one's home and children as allowed under North Carolina's Domestic
Violence Act.2a
II. RESPONDENTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
"The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that
certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be de-
prived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures .... The
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be
granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented... [No] later hearing and no
damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of proce-
dural due process has already assured.
Id. at 81-82. Such strong language against property deprivation absent procedural safeguards is
tempered by the Court saying further that "[there may be cases in which a creditor could make a
showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or cancel disputed goods." Id. at 93. Note,
however, that the ax parte garnishment cases involve temporary deprivation of property alone. The
special procedural due process problems raised by depriving respondents' liberty interests in their
children under the Act is addressed at the text accompanying notes 29-39 infra.
24. 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975).
25. 416 U.S. 600, 606-08 (1974).
26. 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. See infra text accompanying note 35.
28. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982). Unlike garnishment,
protection orders under Chapter 50B carry stiff criminal penalties if violated. See infra text accom-
panying note 60.
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answer to that question is not to be found in [state law]."' 9 Justice
White's proclamation for the Court in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill affirmed that whenever individual liberty or property inter-
ests have been deprived by state procedures, due process requires that
certain processes be provided to the individual before depriving him of
these interests. Traditionally such procedural due process requires notice
and a hearing prior to deprivation.3"
Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and
custody of their children.31 This liberty interest has been recognized by
the Court for years.32 There is also a constitutionally protected funda-
mental property interest in one's home.33
"[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, 'the
question remains what process is due.' "I' What process is due to some-
one whose liberty or property rights have been deprived requires a bal-
ancing of:
(1) their private interest that will be affected by the official action,
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the pro-
cedures entail.35
Although North Carolina has not yet addressed respondents' due pro-
cess rights under the Act, cases from other jurisdictions can guide North
Carolina courts in applying and reviewing the constitutionality of the
Act. In State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh,3 6 the Missouri Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of Missouri's newly enacted Adult Abuse
29. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
30. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
32. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). A parent's right in controlling the up-
bringing of his child is limited by the right of unmarried minors to obtain an abortion without
parental consent. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental consent
requirement was held unconstitutional only if the minor's right to seek an abortion was unduly
burdened).
33. State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982). The due process property
interest in access to one's home implicated by the governmental procedures used, such as in Chapter
50B, is recognized by the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments as part of procedural
due process analysis, distinct from an unjustly compensated taking of property under the taking
clause of the 5th amendment. Although such deprivation of access to one's home may also consti-
tute an unjust taking under the 5th amendment, such is beyond the scope of this comment.
Some criticisms of procedural due process analysis are found in Herman, The New Liberty: The
Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
482 (1984). Professor Gunther suggests that the Burger Court, by "shrinking" the scope of liberty in
procedural due process cases, may be casting doubt on the Court's broad interpretation of liberty in
the substantive due process cases. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578 (11 th ed. 1985).
34. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
35. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
36. 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982).
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Act as applied to a respondent alleged to have abused his spouse. He was
restrained from abusing the petitioner and prevented from entering the
parties' home. Petitioner secured this relief through an ex' parte protec-
tion order which required the respondent to be notified of the order and
the date set for a hearing on the merits.
In Marsh, the respondent's liberty and property interests in his home
and children were clearly deprived. The court weighed these private in-
terests as substantial under Mathews v. Eldridge.37 Nevertheless, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of these rights by granting a protection order
to a petitioner absent any real threat of immediate harm did not out-
weigh the state's substantial interest in protecting women and children
from physical violence. The process due the respondent was a hearing to
determine the merits of the petitioner's allegations. The urgency of pro-
tecting families from violence justified depriving the respondent of access
to his home and children before the hearing.
Loudermill, which requires enough of a prior hearing to give one an
"opportunity to present his side of the story,"3 8 involved the dismissal of
a tenured public employee. That situation is clearly distinguishable from
one arising under the Act: the requirement of a hearing before dismissal
for tenured employees implicates a greater property interest than re-
straining one from his home and children for up to ten days. Depriving a
person of his livelihood can be permanently devastating. Restraining a
person's access to his children or property for ten days, although poten-
tially as devastating, is a short lived deprivation. A tenured employee's
need to tell his side of the story before dismissal overrides the govern-
ment's need for administrative efficiency. In contrast, an alleged abuser
can seek the hearing any time before the ten day maximum under the
Act. He could be back in the house the next day if both parties are
available and the judge so decides. The reason for not requiring a pre-
deprivation hearing for an alleged abuser is the urgent state interest in
protecting women and children from immediate harm. As the court in
Marsh held, this is reason enough to grant a temporary restraining order
before a hearing. Although Loudermill is the latest and most affirmative
word from the Supreme Court regarding the procedural due process
right to a hearing before deprivation of a state created property interest,
respondents challenging the constitutionality of the Act for lack of a pre-
deprivation hearing may have to look elsewhere for controlling prece-
dent. Loudermill seems sufficiently distinguishable from situations aris-
ing under the Act to make it inapplicable on its facts.
In Smart, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that temporary
orders under the Act, granting petitioner emergency relief and child cus-
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
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tody pending a hearing, are interlocutory and do not affect any substan-
tial rights of the respondent which cannot be protected by timely appeal
from the trial court's ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on the
merits. 9 It declined to address the defendant's contention that the Act is
unconstitutional as applied to him."°
In a footnote the court stated that the standard for showing good cause
is a showing of "immediate and present danger" before temporarily de-
priving alleged abusers of liberty and/or property rights under the Act.41
No clear evidentiary standard is given. New York's "fair preponderance
of the evidence" standard used when terminating parental rights due to
neglect was held to be inadequate due process in Santosky v. Kramer.42
Instead, a "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard is now required in
proceedings terminating parental rights.43 One can only guess what the
standard of proof is in North Carolina for showing an "immediate and
present danger" when alleging threatened abuse sufficient to deprive re-
spondents of access to their children and homes for up to ten days before
a hearing. A clear, cogent and convincing standard may be too high a
burden for such a short term deprivation of interests under the Act. The
probable cause standard used for issuing arrest warrants is a better alter-
native; a lower standard is more conducive to the emergency situations
that call for TRO's wherein evidence must be gathered quickly.
III. PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. Chapter 5OB-The Domestic Violence Act
By 1978 almost all states provided some type of temporary emergency
relief from domestic violence.' In 1978 North Carolina lacked even a
civil injunction against abusive spouses.45 The State Legislature re-
sponded in 1979 by adopting the Domestic Violence Act, offering broad
relief upon commencement of a civil action by threatened spouses.46
The Act defines domestic violence as attempted or actual physical in-
39. 59 N.C. App. at 536, 297 S.E.2d at 137-38.
40. Id. at 534, 297 S.E.2d at 135.
41. Id. at 535 n.1, 297 S.E.2d at 137 n.1.
42. 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. The Progress of State Domestic Violence Legislation, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) MONOGRAPH
No. 5 (July 25, 1978).
45. Id.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B (1984) (effective October 1, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the
Act]. Mr. Fred Stang, Director of the Change Program of Durham-Orange Counties, a counseling
program for men who physically abuse women, is concerned that the financial cost of bringing a
private civil action for a temporary restraining order under Chapter 50B discourages its use. The
paperwork is confusing, establishing sufficient proof to convince the magistrate to issue relief is diffi-
cult, and placing the burden of proof on the abused woman decreases Chapter 5OB's utility. Inter-
view with Fred Stang, Director of the Change Program of Durham-Orange Counties, North
Carolina, in Durham, North Carolina (Aug. 7, 1985).
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jury between past or present spouses or persons of the opposite sex living
together or who have lived together, or placing that other person in fear
of immediate serious bodily injury by threat of force.4 7
Civil actions for relief are limited to persons residing in North Caro-
lina.48 District courts have original jurisdiction over these civil actions 49
and a hearing must be held within ten days of the filing of the motion."
"Prior to the hearing and upon a finding of good cause the court shall
enter such temporary orders as it deems necessary to protect petitioner
or minor children. Immediate and present danger of such acts upon the
petitioner or minor children constitutes good cause."5 "
"District courts may grant any protective order or approve any con-
sent agreement to bring about a cessation of acts of domestic violence."52
Contrasted with North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 65(b), the
broad relief available under the Act reflects the urgency of state legisla-
tures in preventing a proliferation of domestic violence. 3 Relief in-
cludes: 1) directing a party to refrain from violent acts; 2) granting
possession of the residence to petitioner and excluding respondent's
access; 3) requiring respondent to provide petitioner and her children
suitable alternative housing; 4) awarding temporary custody of minor
children and establishing temporary visitation rights; 5) evicting respon-
dent from the residence and assisting petitioner in returning to it; 6) or-
dering either party to pay support of a minor child as required by law;
7) ordering either party to pay support of a spouse as required by law;
8) providing for possession of personal property of the parties; 9) order-
ing respondent to refrain from harassing or interfering with petitioner;
and 10) awarding costs and attorney's fees to either party.5 4 Protective or
consent orders entered or approved are not to exceed one year and are to
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (1984). Homosexuals would not have a cause of action since
Chapter SOB limits the definition of domestic violence to persons of the opposite sex. Although this
ignores the possibility that gay cohabitants can threaten one another with violence as readily as
heterosexual cohabitants, Chapter 50B is consistent with cases refusing to recognize a due process
right to engage in homosexual conduct. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(the Court summarily affirmed, without a hearing or giving reasons, a federal court's dismissal of a
challenge by male homosexuals to Virginia's anti-sodomy statute); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (An unsuccessful attack on the Navy's policy of mandatory discharge of
homosexuals. The court refuted the claim that private consensual homosexual activity falls within
the constitutionally protected zones of privacy under the Griswold-Roe line of cases.). For a review
of the status of a due process right to engage in homosexual conduct, see Note, Dronenburg v. Zech:
The Wrong Case for Asserting a Right of Privacy for Homosexuals, 63 N.C.L. REv. 749 (1985).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2(a) (1984).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 5OB-2(b).
51. Id. § 5OB-2(c); see supra text accompanying note 12.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a) (1984).
53. Att'y Gen. Task Force on Family Violence, 1984 ATr'Y GEN. REP. 2, 2-5.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(a) (1984).
8
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be for a fixed period of time."
Although respondent is due a hearing within ten days of receiving no-
tice of the court's issuance of the protective order, deprivation of respon-
dents' interests may continue after the hearing for up to one year. The
Act's vagueness causes problems here; no mention is made as to what
kind of evidence is sufficient to allow continuance of protective orders
beyond the date of the hearing. Assuming the hearing is an opportunity
for respondent to "answer the complaint,''56 no mention is given as to
whether the usual rules of procedure and discovery apply. Does respon-
dent need to assert affirmative defenses? If normal filing deadlines apply
and respondent fails to respond in time, does petitioner's motion for relief
become a final judgment entitling her to permanent possession of the
home if the temporary relief excludes respondent from the home? Or
does she only get sole possession from the time of the order not to exceed
one year? If respondent does not respond to the hearing, is his failure to
appear tantamount to an admission of petitioner's averments of threats of
physical violence? These questions and possible answers must be ad-
dressed by future legislators.
A person who has been charged with violating an order entered on
behalf of the petitioner under the Act may be retained in custody for a
reasonable time before the court determines conditions of pretrial release
if, in the discretion of the judge, release of the person poses a threat of
injury to the petitioner.57 Upon pretrial release the defendant may be
ordered to a) stay away from the petitioner's home, school, or place of
employment, b) refrain from assaulting, beating, molesting, or wounding
the petitioner, c) refrain from removing or injuring certain property, and
d) may only visit her or her children as provided by an order entered by
the judge. 8 These orders are similar to the relief granted under § 50B-3
of the Act. They differ in that upon violation of the former the defendant
increases his chances of imprisonment whereas violation of the civil or-
ders under the Act usually increases his chances of extending the denial
of access to his property and family.
Petitioner can motion for contempt for violations by the respondent of
any order under the Act. 9 Police may arrest respondent and take him
into custody if the officer has probable cause to believe that respondent
has violated a court order excluding him from the residence occupied by
the petitioner or directing him to refrain from harassing or interfering
55. Id. § 50B-3(b).
56. "A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies." N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(b).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(1) (1983).
58. Id. § 15A-534.1(2)(a)-(d).
59. Id. § 5OB-4(a) (1984).
9
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with the petitioner.6" The petitioner must give the officer a copy of the
temporary order for relief granted from the court, or the officer may de-
termine that such an order exists through phone, radio, or other commu-
nication with appropriate authorities.61  Under this section the
respondent who is arrested is entitled to pre-trial release under the provi-
sions of section 15A-534.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
Under § 15A, the respondent has usually been apprehended by police
without action by the petitioner. Under the Act, however, petitioner ini-
tiates police proceedings against the respondent via the Chapter 50B pro-
tective order. The Act offers police-protection to bolster the effectiveness
of the ex parte order.
Other emergency assistance is available under the Act to persons alleg-
ing that they have been victims of domestic violence or threats of vio-
lence.62 Local law enforcement personnel shall respond to the request
for help as soon as practicable. They are not required, however, to re-
spond in instances of multiple complaints from the same person if such
complaints are made within forty-eight hours and the local law enforce-
ment agency has reasonable cause to believe that immediate assistance is
not required. The responding officer is authorized to take whatever steps
are reasonably necessary to protect the petitioner from harm. The officer
may advise the petitioner of available shelter, medical care, counseling,
and other services. When feasible the officer shall, upon petitioner's re-
quest, transport her to the hospital, magistrate's office, or other public or
private facilities. He may accompany petitioner to her residence when
within the jurisdiction where the request was made so that she may re-
move food, clothing, medication, and other personal property as is rea-
sonably necessary to enable her and any minor children in her care to
remain elsewhere pending further proceedings. No officer may be held
criminally or civilly liable on account of any reasonable measures taken
in providing authorized emergency assistance.63
The Act should not be construed as granting a status for any purpose
other than those expressly stated in the Act.' The remedies provided by
the Act are not exclusive but are additional to remedies provided in
Chapter 50 of the North Carolina General Statutes on Divorce and Ali-
mony.6 5 Granting of a protective order, approval of a consent agree-
ment, prosecution for violation of the Act, or granting of any relief under
the Act should not be construed to afford a defense to any person
charged with fornication and adultery or any other offense against the
60. Id. § 50B-4(b).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 50B-5(a) (1984).
63. Id. § 50B-5(b).
64. Id. § 50B-6.
65. Id. § 50B-7.
10
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public morals.66
B. North Carolina's Act as Compared to Legislation in Other States
Over half the states grant orders of one form or another protecting
persons from domestic violence.67 Such orders are usually injunctions
designed to prevent violence by one member of a household against an-
other. North Carolina allows district courts to order the eviction of al-
leged abusers from the home, as do at least thirty other states. The Act
does not restrict the temporary grant of eviction to petitioners who are
joint tenants with the respondent. West Virginia, on the other hand, ex-
pressly limits the temporary grant of sole possession of the residence to
petitioners who jointly own or rent with the respondent.68
The temporary grant of sole possession is perhaps the most important
form of relief provided by preventive domestic violence legislation.69 It
gives the potential abuser the chance to diffuse anger outside the original
hostility-producing environs. Although "cooling off" periods are essen-
tial to preventing the threat of immediate violence, domestic legislation
which does not provide funding for long-term counseling of abusive men
does not fully treat the problem. Only with services such as the Change
Program of Durham and Orange Counties which offer counseling to men
who are abusive toward women can the long-term problems of domestic
violence be mitigated.7"
The Act protects present and former spouses, and persons living to-
gether or who have lived together as if married. Cohabitants are thereby
protected from each other, although cohabitation is unlawful in North
Carolina.7
66. Id. § 50B-8.
67. Lerman, supra note 6, at 2.
68. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6(l)(b) (1980). Although North Carolina grants temporary posses-
sion of the residence to women whether or not they jointly own or rent with the respondent, such an
order is difficult to get if the judge is reluctant to remove a man from the home. See infra text
accompanying notes 103-04.
69. Lerman, supra note 6, at 2.
70. See Interview with Fred Stang, supra note 46.
71. "If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously
associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.C. GEN. ST,%T. § 14-
184 (1981). Petitioners must be of the opposite sex from the respondent to be protected under
Chapter 50B. Id. § 50B-1 (1984). No state has explicitly recognized a due process right to engage in
homosexual conduct. See supra note 46, discussing the lack of a due process right to engage in
homosexual conduct under Dronenburg v. Zech. Such a right is unlikely to be upheld by an appel-
late court in the near future in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), wherein the
Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, holding that due process does not include the
right to engage in consensual homosexual activity. A recent Virginia Supreme Court decision denied
child custody to a gay parent carrying on a homosexual relationship in the home where the child
lived. [Such a denial was held to be in the child's interest.] Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691
(1985). As a result of this decision it is unlikely that Virginia would grant even temporary custody
of children to gay parents under an ex parte order granted to prevent domestic violence. Further-
more, since Virginia limits protective orders to excluding the petitioner's spouse from the marital
11
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North Carolina does not specifically protect parents or other related
household members. In Maryland,72 orders protecting household mem-
bers from threatened violence extend to spouses, parents, children, and
blood relatives who live together at the time of an abusive act.73 Any of
these household members may petition for relief from abuse by any other
household member, not just spouses or children.74
North Carolina and at least thirty-five other states grant temporary ex
parte protective orders which usually last up to ten days before notice
and a hearing must be afforded to the alleged abuser.75 Oregon grants
protective orders upon a showing of immediate and present danger of
abuse for the longest available time-up to one year before a hearing.
7 6
The North Carolina Domestic Violence Act does not specify how long
after the filing of the petition the order will be issued, but the protective
order and its relief are effective immediately upon approval of the peti-
tion by the district court.
When physical violence is threatened at night or on weekends, some
states such as Missouri provide special relief. Verified petitions may be
filed with any circuit or associate circuit court judge in the city or court
having jurisdiction to hear the petition.77 North Carolina's Act is un-
clear here; emergency assistance is available to a petitioner from local
law enforcement officials "as soon as possible."78 Where feasible police
may transport the petitioner to a magistrate's office, hospital or other
facilities.79 It can be inferred that this language directing officers to
transport the petitioner to a magistrate's office in case of an emergency is
for the purpose of filing an ex parte petition for emergency 50B relief. If
this is so, then North Carolina provides some of the fastest relief from
potential domestic violence available in the country.8" However, the
emergency relief section of the Act needs to be revised to include a week-
night-weekend emergency filing procedure. This will make the provision
procedurally understandable and thereby more efficient. Without a pro-
tective order in the petitioner's hand ordering law enforcement officials
home, homosexuals will not be protected as long as marriage is limited to persons of the opposite
sex. VA. CODE § 20-103 (1983).
72. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 4-501(e) (1984).
73. Id. § 4-504(a).
74. Id.
75. Lerman, supra note 6, at 3.
76. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (1983).
77. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(1) (Vernon 1985).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5 (1984).
79. Id.
80. The author recently filed a 50B Complaint in the Wake County Domestic Court in Raleigh,
North Carolina, on a Friday morning requesting, among other things, a protective order for his
client. The client picked up her copy of the signed order that afternoon. Within an hour she was in
the parties' marital home collecting food and clothing for herself and the parties' children, escorted
by local police.
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to cooperate, police are less likely to take a woman's allegations of physi-
cal abuse seriously. Missouri's Adult Abuse Act provides that "[a]t the
hearing, if the petitioner has proved the allegation of abuse by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the court may issue a full order of protection for
a definite period of time, not to exceed one hundred eighty days."81
North Carolina's Domestic Violence Act does not specify an evidentiary
standard for either showing good cause when issuing an ex parte protec-
tive order,8" or later at the hearing before the district court on the mer-
its.8 3  The United States Supreme Court struck New York's
preponderance of the evidence standard for parental rights termination
proceedings in Santosky v. Kramer,84 as an unconstitutional burden on
the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care and cus-
tody of their children.8 5 There is no standard of proof under Chapter
50B to determine at the ex parte hearing the merits of a petitioner's alle-
gations of threatened abuse by an alleged abuser. A standard must be
supplied promptly, either by the legislature or the appellate courts, to
comport with present constitutional analysis. As noted in Santosky,
"this Court never has approved case-by-case determinations of the
proper standard of proof for a given procedure .... Retrospective case-
by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of pro-
ceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary stan-
dard."86  Although deprivation of parental liberty interests in one's
children of the type in Santosky is permanent, a temporary deprivation of
the same interest under Chapter 50B does not warrant the complete ab-
sence of an evidentiary standard simply because the deprivation is tempo-
rary. Once fundamental due process interests are deprived, the only
question remaining is what process is due, not whether process is due.
8 7
It behooves women living in North Carolina to lobby their legislators to
amend Chapter 50B to include some evidentiary standard for the exparte
hearing on the merits. Protective orders granted on the basis of a hearing
backed by a clearly articulated evidentiary standard are less likely to be
held unconstitutional on appeal. A probable cause-type of standard
would work well here. District court judges, accustomed to applying the
probable cause standard to criminal arrest warrants, can review a wo-
man's allegations of physical abuse under a 50B petition using the same
standard.
Sexual abuse, both emotional and physical, can lead to or may itself be
81. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(1) (Vernon 1986).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2(b) (1984).
83. Smart v. Smart, 59 N.C. App. 533, 535 n.1, 297 S.E.2d 135, 137 n.1 (1982).
84. 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 757.
86. Id. at 757 (emphasis in the original).
87. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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domestic violence. The state of protective orders from sexual abuse is
among the most inconsistent and ineffective in domestic violence legisla-
tion. North Carolina can pave new legislative ground by expressly
prohibiting the attempted or threatened sexual abuse of women and chil-
dren as acts from which petitioners may seek temporary ex parte emer-
gency relief by so amending the Act.
North Carolina authorizes law enforcement agencies to accompany a
victim to her residence to pick up children or personal property.88 How-
ever, the general reluctance of patrol officers to respond to calls of do-
mestic violence makes it unlikely that this type of emergency assistance is
easily attainable by victims.89 Police fear for their own safety in domestic
situations. That the domestic dwelling can become a domestic battle-
ground90 must be recognized by women seeking police help. Lawyers
advising abused women looking for legal assistance may want to advise
their clients to seek alternative shelter rather than wait for police escort
into the marital home. Many of the great number of murdered spouses
or lovers were killed at home.91 Despite this general fear and reluctance,
mental health professionals in Durham, North Carolina, note the some-
what favorable response of public safety officers to the emergency assist-
ance needs of abused women in their city.92 Other cities enjoy favorable
responses from local officials, as well as wide use of protective orders.9 3
This strengthens the importance of arming abused women with protec-
tive orders before re-entering the marital home after an explosive
episode.
To perhaps assuage local police reluctance (as well as protect govern-
mental subdivisions from liability), the Act includes a disclaimer of crim-
inal or civil liability for any police officer giving emergency assistance on
account of reasonable measures taken under authority of the Act's emer-
gency assistance provisions.94 This may partly explain the generally
favorable response of Durham's public safety officers to calls alleging do-
mestic violence.
Police also have discretion under chapter 50B not to respond to calls
for help where a single petitioner has made multiple complaints within
forty-eight hours and there is "reasonable cause" to believe that immedi-
ate assistance is not needed.95 None of the other states in the Fourth
Circuit have a similar provision. Neither does Missouri or Maryland,
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1984).
89. See generally CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
90. See generally Hearings, supra note 3.
91. Id.
92. See Interview with Fred Stang, supra note 46.
93. Brown, Remaining Problems with the Adult Abuse Act, 1982 J. Mo. B. 582, 583.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(b) (1984).
95. Id. § 50B-5(a).
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both with preventive domestic violence legislation more comprehensive
than North Carolina.
Governmental enforcement of Chapter 50B depends on the Act's con-
stitutionality. A statute vague on its face is unconstitutional, and must
therefore give sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed or required.96 A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.97 To
avoid unconstitutional vagueness legislation must "set reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to pre-
vent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' "98
The provision of Chapter 50B that allows police not to respond on the
belief that there is reasonable cause not to do so" may be challenged as
unconstitutionally vague. Although not a true vagueness problem in that
50B does not proscribe conduct in a general sense, i.e. conduct prohibited
by law, the "reasonable cause" standard is not clear enough to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by police. The provision gives
police ultimate discretion to decide whether a situation from which they
are physically removed warrants police response. Police obviously can-
not respond to every call. But, if the legislature's intent to prevent do-
mestic violence is to be effective, the police decision to respond must be
made with prevention in mind. Limiting police discretion should be con-
sidered when amending the Act.
IV. IMPLEMENTING CHAPTER 50B IN NORTH CAROLINA
Little statistical data is available showing how often ex parte protective
relief under Chapter 50B has been granted. Aside from a survey of
North Carolina magistrates by the Governor's Task Force on Domestic
Violence," ° no data has been published reflecting the frequency of peti-
tions granted by district courts throughout the state. The City of St.
Louis Circuit Court recorded 1,438 ex parte orders issued in 1981.101
One of the shortcomings noted in Chapter 50B is a lack of provision for
data collection, which greatly helps law enforcement personnel keep
track of the effectiveness of the act as preventative.'
0 2
First hand experience from the bench is illuminating. Durham County
District Court Judge Orlando F. Hudson says that granting ex parte or-
96. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
97. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
98. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (footnote omitted) (vagueness standard in first
amendment context).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-5(a) (1984).
100. Magistrate's Survey: Governor's Task Force on Domestic Violence, Aug. 9, 1984.
101. See Brown, supra note 93 (citing St. Louis County Reports 575, Greene County Reports 90,
and Jackson County Reports 74).
102. See Lerman, supra note 6.
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ders evicting men from their homes can be "constitutionally danger-
ous."t°3 A man's fundamental property and liberty interests are strong in
the eyes of the law. Judge Hudson says that evidence must be particu-
larly convincing before he will issue a temporary ex parte protective or-
der under Chapter 50B evicting a man from his own home. The judge is
more likely to evict a man from leased premises as part of a grant of relief
to the woman.
In support of Chapter 50B, Judge Hudson believes that even with its
questionable constitutionality an ex parte protective order is the best re-
sponse to the emergencies of domestic violence. The judge simply uses
his discretion. The bad part is that judges get only one party's story.
Also, there is no provision in Chapter 50B allowing damages to respon-
dents who may be economically injured by frivolous claims (i.e. time
away from work to appear in court, and/or attorney's fees). The ability
to award damages to men who have been subjected to frivolous claims
might make a judge more willing to order exclusive possession of the
marital home to the woman for ten days until the hearing with both par-
ties. The threat of frivolous claims weakens the validity of the allegations
of abuse in Chapter 50B petitions. "Revenge," notes Judge Hudson, "is
not a far-fetched motive in domestic cases."' 1 4
A. Alternatives
A hearing within forty-eight hours of filing instead of ten days would
lessen the effects of an erroneous deprivation of a respondent's liberty
and property interests in his children and home.
Chapter 50B should require notice of service of the protective order
upon the allegedly abusive man to be served the same day as the granting
of the ex parte order to the petitioner. Service should be directed on the
individual named in the order, unlike Missouri practice which allows
anyone at the residence over age fifteen to be served. 105 A clear eviden-
tiary standard must be supplied for the judge to decide the sufficiency of
the petitioner's allegations at the ex parte hearing. A clear, cogent and
103. Interview with Orlando F. Hudson, District Court Judge for Durham County, North Caro-
lina, in Durham, North Carolina (Oct. 15, 1985). One practitioner emphasizes the sorry state of
judicial regard toward Chapter 50B protective orders: Ilene B. Nelson notes that at least three Wake
County District Court judges flatly refuse to grant petitioners temporary restraining orders against
allegedly abusive men. Ms. Nelson has to choose her judges carefully in order to get relief for her
clients under Chapter 50B. As for prosecutorial regard, she recently tried to get a prosecutor to
acknowledge four prior assault convictions against a man who was tried a fifth time for assaulting his
wife, this time with a loaded pistol. The prosecutor never returned Ms. Nelson's calls. The husband
was convicted again for assaulting his wife, but without evidence of the prior convictions. He was
fined fifty dollars. Interview with Ilene B. Nelson, Associate Attorney, Edelstein & Payne, Raleigh,
North Carolina, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Jan. 3, 1986).
104. Interview with Orlando F. Hudson, District Court Judge for Durham County, North Caro-
lina, in Durham, North Carolina (Oct. 15, 1985).
105. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.035 (1985).
16
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/6
98 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
convincing standard may be too strict for petitioners to meet. A prob-
able cause type of standard would be easier to apply.
As public funding has been scarce for shelters or alternative housing
for abused women to turn to for help, private groups such as the Cleve-
land County Abuse Prevention Council of North Carolina are funding
housing in and around the homes of abused and battered women who
cannot live at home with an abusive man, but who also cannot leave the
area because of work or school locations."6 State and local funding is
needed to assist such private groups which are long on effort but sadly
short on money.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina's recent response to the problem of domestic violence
is Chapter 50B, the Domestic Violence Act. Chapter 50B provides
abused spouses and lovers-overwhelmingly women-with emergency
civil remedies protecting them from actual or threatened physical abuse.
The most important provision allows women to petition a court for tem-
porary emergency relief based solely on their allegations. The court can
order the man not to abuse the woman, award the woman sole custody of
the children, and even exclusive possession of the home for up to ten days
before a hearing on the merits involving both parties.
The constitutionality of the Act has not been addressed yet by the
North Carolina appellate courts. The one-sided nature of any procedure
granting emergency relief based merely on one side's allegations raises
procedural due process questions. Missouri's Supreme Court has re-
cently upheld the constitutionality of a similar statute, holding that the
governmental interest in protecting women and children from harm is
substantial, and outweighs a man's interest in his home and children for
ten days. There is no clear evidentiary standard for granting or denying
a petition under Chapter 50B leaving the statute open to a vagueness
attack on constitutional grounds. A probable cause standard for the ex
parte hearing is urged either through legislative amendment or judicial
development.
Implementing Chapter 50B in North Carolina is more difficult than
may be expected. Although no data is kept, it is unlikely that protective
orders are utilized in North Carolina as often as in St. Louis, Missouri,
where over 1,400 similar orders were issued in 1981. Mandatory arrest
and criminal prosecution of abusive men has been suggested to alert all
parties involved of the seriousness of domestic violence. The Wake
County defendant who was fined fifty dollars after a fifth conviction for
106. Shelby Group Hopes To Open Battered Womens' Shelter, The Charlotte Observer, Dec. 23,
1985, at 1B, col. 1.
17
Duane: North Carolina's Domestic Violence Act: Preventing Spouse Abuse
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1988
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 99
assaulting his wife does not take Chapter 50B seriously. The North Car-
olina legislature must amend the statute with stricter, clearer guidelines
for judges and lawyers to follow. The appellate courts must develop
clear constitutional standards for trial courts to apply.
MICHAEL J. DUANE
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